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Strange might it seem that concepts and precepts originating in Equity play
major roles in the complex regulatory schemes created by many contemporary
statutes. Indeed, some of the most controversial aspects of these schemes stem
from their equity-based components. The articles in this symposium illustrate
both the practical significance and the pervasive nature of Equity's controversial
contributions to contemporary regulatory structures.
Equity's constructs have qualities that explain their long-enduring appeal as
well as their inducement to controversy. Equity doctrines are visibly malleable.
Doctrines like unconscionability and undue influence, for example, lack sharp
edges that define with clarity and precision the conduct that will make a
transaction vulnerable to successful challenge. Moreover, Equity's approach to
remedies, likewise flexible, created possibilities beyond the winner-take-all
prospect of the common law. Justice Joseph Story, writing initially in 1836 to
expound Equity's basic features, explained that
one of the most striking and distinctive features of Courts of Equity is, that they
can adapt their decrees to all the varieties of circumstances, which may arise, and
adjust them to all the peculiar rights of all the parties in interest; whereas Courts
of Common Law... are bound down to a fixed and invariable form of judgment
in general terms, altogether absolute, for the plaintiff or for the defendant.'

However admirably sensitive to context and particulars, equity doctrines and
remedies may also be applied unpredictably and arbitrarily.2
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1. Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in England and America
§ 28 at 28 (1st ed. Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1836). Justice Story's footnote states that "[m]uch of
this paragraph has been abstracted from Dr. Lieber's Encyclopedia Americana, article 'Equity."' Id. at
28 n.1. Justice Story, in turn, contributed 120 double-columned pages to his friend Lieber's
Encyclopedia. See Paul D. Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political
Ethics of Francis Lieber, 42 J. Legal Educ. 339, 361 (1992).
2. Justice Story noted that prior to the appointment of Chancellor Kent in New York in 1814, "'the
[equity] doctrines of the Courts depended much less upon the settled analogies of the system, than upon
the character of the particular judge. If he possessed a large and liberal mind, he stretched them to a
most unwarrantable extent; if a cautious and cold one, the system fainted and expired under his
curatorship."' 1 William W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story 233 (1851). Justice Story credited
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Justice Story noted as well Equity's sensitivity and responsiveness to the
human phenomenon of trust and Equity's ingenuity in remedying abuses of trust
that "Courts of Common Law do not recognize at all, or, if they do recognize
them, they leave them wholly to the conscience and good will of the parties."'
To Equity is credited authorship of the trust as an enforceable legal construct
and the creation of remedies, available in a variety of settings for "many cases
of oppressive proceedings, undue advantages and impositions, betrayals of
confidence, and unconscionable bargains; in all of which Courts of Equity will
interfere and grant redress, but which the common law takes no notice of, or
silently disregards."4 Equity's progeny thus includes fiduciary duties, duties
whose content is somewhat variable.
Several articles in this symposium remark upon the protean quality of equity
doctrines. Professor Baxter's article' evaluates the claim that directors of
federally insured banking institutions and their professional advisers owe a direct
fiduciary duty to act in and with regard to the interests of their federal
regulators. Within the "labyrinth of federal banking legislation," 6 the addition
of such a fiduciary duty would add nothing of substance to statutorily specified
requirements that directors operate the institution to maintain its safety and
soundness.7 To the regulators, however, the lure of imposing a direct fiduciary
duty is that it would have enabled them "to determine the content of the duty
owed to them without regard to potentially applicable state law standards of
fiduciary duty," on a case-by-case basis incident to enforcement actions.' In
short, the duty's lack of initial definition helps explain its appeal. Mr. Fisher's
article emphasizes the value regulators likely ascribe to novel and protean
theories of liability as bases to expand counsel's liability for advice given to
federally insured depository institutions.9 My own article examines another
equity concept, oppression, in the context of Canadian corporations legislation,
contrasting its operation with counterpart regulation in the United States.
Oppression is a protean, amoeba-like concept that resists initial definition and
indeed operates, at least in the Canadian context, to discourage and even defeat
ex ante specifications of entitlements. °

Chancellor Kent with Equity's assumption in New York of a "'steady and well defined shape."' Id.
Story's son (and biographer) credited both with disentangling Equity in the United States from "many
of the useless forms and complicate processes in which the English system is entangled, and gave to it
that certainty and despatch, which is in England its greatest want." Id. at 234.
3. STORY, supra note 1, § 29 at 28.
4. Id.
5. Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, 56 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (Winter 1993).
6. See id. at 23.
7. Id. at 23-24.
8. Id. at 30.
9. See Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor's Toesies: A "Roguish" Concurrence with
Professor Baxter, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 50 (Winter 1993).

10. See Deborah A. DeMott, Oppressed But Not Betrayed: A ComparativeAssessment of Canadian
Remedies for Minority Shareholdersand other CorporateConstituents,56 LAW & CoNTEMP.PROBS. 183,
221-23 (Winter 1993).
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Separately, symposium articles analyze the strengths and limits of fiduciary
duty in complex regulatory settings. Professor Stein assesses the efficacy of
Equity's contributions to the federal regulation of employee benefit plans created
by Congress in ERISA. That ERISA imposes fiduciary duties on persons in
control of such plans and otherwise borrows from Equity does not, he argues,
adequately resolve a number of fundamental and recurring questions.11 In
particular, the plan's sponsor determines, free of fiduciary constraints, whether
to provide a plan as well as the plan's design,12 while regulation (including
regulation through the imposition of fiduciary duty) does not conduce toward
plan formation.1 3 Professor Alexander, more generally, argues that the trustbased structure for ownership of pension plan assets, dictated by ERISA, results
in passive ownership of plan assets by plan participants that is politically and
morally problematic.14 Fiduciary duty itself presupposes that "the appropriate
role of pension owners is that of passive investors, rather than self-governing and
responsible owners." 5 Paradoxically, though, greater control by plan participants likely undercuts the ultimate security of their pensions.
In various ways, several articles recognize that the interest of the United
States as an insurer or other stakeholder of last resort contributes both analytic
and normative complications. Dean Wolk, justifying the passive ownership role
into which fiduciary norms cast participants in a pension plan, notes that the
federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") insures benefit payouts
in defined benefit plans.16 As a result, the PBGC is "vitally interested in proper
trust investment;" from its standpoint, propriety virtually defines itself as that
investment or management strategy which minimizes the likelihood of claims on
the PBGC. The regulatory strategy criticized by Professor Baxter and Mr.
Fisher, likewise, entailed regulators' assertion of fiduciary duty to reduce
prospectively the risk of claims on federal deposit insurers or, retrospectively,
regulators' assertion of past breaches of such a duty as a basis upon which to
impose penalties which would in monetary effect reduce the drain on the federal
insurance funds. Mr. O'Hara's article explores the propriety of equitable
defenses, such as caveat emptor, in actions brought to recover the cost of
cleaning up contaminated property under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"). In the postCERCLA world, the federal government acting through the Environmental

11. See Norman Stein, ERISA and the Limits of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMIP. PROBs. 71, 82
(Winter 1993).

12.

Id. at 88.

13.
14.

Id. at 110.
See Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 113 (Winter

1993).
15.
16.
(Winter
17.

Id. at 126.
See Bruce A, Wolk, Comment: Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 146
1993).
See id.
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Protection Agency, spending monies in the Superfund,"8 is the environmental
stakeholder of last (and often of first) resort. CERCLA disallows the caveat
emptor defense in actions brought by the United States against potentially
responsible parties to reimburse Superfund for cleanup costs because it places
greater priority on the rapid replenishment of Superfund; 9 in private litigation-such as actions for contribution subsequent to recoveries by the United
States-Mr. O'Hara argues such a defense should be available.
Symposium participants also acknowledge that legal doctrines, including those
derived from Equity, do not operate in a vacuum; indeed the practical efficacy
of doctrine in a complex regulatory scheme often turns on its extra-legal impact
on behavior. Will the doctrine, all things considered, encourage socially favored
behavior while discouraging socially disfavored behavior? Mr. O'Hara argues
that by legitimating the use of caveat emptor in private litigation under
CERCLA, courts would create incentives for the prompt revelation of
information about contamination from sellers to buyers of property by
encouraging the buyer to assess known environmental costs accurately in
determining the price to pay for the property. The seller's incentive, otherwise,2
may be to conceal rather than reveal full information about the contamination. 0
Professor Stein, likewise concerned with ERISA's efficacy in discouraging
socially disfavored conduct, observes that however stringently they are cast,
fiduciary standards are not self-enforcing. 2' Fiduciaries who are not adequately
monitored are likely, sometimes accurately but sometimes erroneously, to resolve
uncertain questions so as to further their own benefit.'
To be sure, these insights are not newly revealed in late twentieth-century
regulatory contexts. Describing the import of doctrines of constructive fraud,'
Justice Story wrote
they will be found to be founded in an anxious desire of the law to apply the
principle of preventive justice, so as to shut out the inducements to perpetuate
a wrong, rather than to rely on mere remedial justice, after a wrong has been
committed. By disarming the parties of all legal sanction and protection, they
suppress the temptations and encouragements, which might otherwise be found
too strong for their virtue.'

18. See Michael O'Hara, IncreasingFairnessand Market Efficiency in Real Property Transactions:
The Utilization of Caveat Emptorin CERCLA PrivateParty Cleanups,56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 151,
157-58 (Winter 1993).
19. See id. at 158.
20. Id. at 165.
21. Stein, supra note 11, at 108.
22. Id. at 105.
23. That is,
such contracts or acts as, though not originating in any actual evil design or contrivance to
perpetrate a positive fraud or injury upon other persons, are yet, by their tendency to
deceive or mislead other persons, or to violate private or public confidence, or to impair
or injure the public interests, deemed equally reprehensible with positive fraud, and
therefore, are prohibited by law, as within the same reason and mischief, as contracts and
acts done malo animo.
STORY, supra note 1, § 258 at 261.
24.

Id.
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The point remains true, although the focus of its application has shifted from
private transactions typically involving interests in real property to statutorily
defined regulatory structures. Through such statutes, Equity gains contexts to
apply and refine its doctrines, ones identified by acronyms, but the underlying
choices and dilemmas are not so different from Justice Story's perception of
them.

